The argument from injustice

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At the heart of this work is the enduring question of the relationship between law and morality. Legal positivists advocate for a clear separation, defining law independently of moral considerations. The author counters this perspective, asserting that there are necessary conceptual connections between law and morality, along with normative reasons for integrating moral elements into the legal framework. While each argument alone is insufficient to establish a robust link between the two, together they support a nonpositivistic understanding of law, challenging legal positivism as a comprehensive theory. The author employs a conceptual framework of five distinctions to explore various presuppositions regarding the law-morality relationship. This analysis reveals perspectives that align strictly with positivism, yet crucially identifies a necessary perspective that supports a nonpositivistic view. This perspective comes from participants in the legal system seeking correct answers to legal questions. The participant-thesis is illustrated through Gustav Radbruch's formula, which posits that extreme injustice cannot be considered law, and through judges' balancing of principles in case decisions. Ultimately, the author proposes a legal concept that harmonizes classical elements of legal positivism—such as authoritative issuance and social efficacy—with the nonpositivistic ideal of content correctness.