James S. Corum Boeken

"An expert account of Nazi Germany's air war during the Spanish Civil War, where air power turned the tide for Franco and taught the Luftwaffe how to wage Blitzkrieg"-- Amazon.com

"A history of the innovative German air campaign that ensured victory in the rapid conquest of Norway, and an analysis of its importance to World War II and the development of air power. The Campaign for Norway in 1940 was a pivotal moment in modern warfare. It was the first modern joint campaign that featured not only ground and naval operations, but also airpower as an equal element of all operations. Indeed, Norway was the first campaign in history where air superiority, possessed by the Germans, was able to overcome the overwhelming naval superiority, possessed by the British. German success in Norway was not pre-ordained. At several times in the opening weeks of the campaign the Norwegian and Allied forces could have inflicted a major defeat on the Germans if their operations had been effectively supported. It was, in fact, the superior German use of their air force that gave the Germans the decisive margin of victory and ensured the failure of the Allied counteroffensive in central Norway in April and May of 1940. The Norwegian campaign featured some firsts in the use of airpower including the first use of paratroops to seize key objectives and the first sinking of a major warship by dive bombers. All aspects of airpower played important roles in the campaign, from air reconnaissance to strategic bombing and ground-based air defenses. The British employed their Bomber Command in long-distance strikes to disrupt the German air and naval bases and the Germans used their bomber force to carry out long-range support of their ground forces. The German ability to transport large numbers of troops by air and the ability to supply their ground and air forces over great distances gave the Germans their first major campaign victory over the Western Allies. Covering the first true joint campaign in warfare, this book provides a complete view of a compelling turning point in World War II. Featuring an analysis of the cooperation of ground, naval and air forces, this book is intended to appeal to a broad range of readers interested in World War II, and specifically to those interested in the role airpower played in the strategic and operational planning of the Campaign for Norway."--Amazon.ca

Researched from original-language primary sources, this is a uniquely well-informed and multi-faceted history of the World War I air campaign of Bloody April. Researched from original German-, French-, and English-language sources, and written by an authority on both air and ground military operations, author, Dr James S Corum examines how Bloody April caused Allied forces to reassess their approach to the use of airpower. Considering well-known problems such as technology and training doctrine, but also how the artillery-aircraft combination ideally had to work in late-WW I ground offensives, Dr Corum analyses what each side got wrong and why. He describes little-known parts of the April campaigns, such as both sides' use of strategic bombing with heavy aircraft, and considers the German use of advanced high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft with oxygen and heated suits while detailing the exploits of the infamous 'Red Baron', Manfred von Richthofen. Lessons from Bloody April not only served to improve the coordination of Allied artillery and aircraft but subsequently aircraft played a much larger role in supporting ground troops in attack mode. Bloody April paved the way for the airpower revolution that, by 1918, would make the Allies masters of the sky on the Western Front.

The staff papers of the Luftwaffe expose the inner workings of the German Air Force's high command. These doctrines have been translated into English by James S. Corum and Richard R. Muller, two distinguished American scholars of air force history. Their work includes pre-World War I correspondence on aviation from General von Moltke, the first German aviation manual guidelines of 1913, World War I air support instructions, a 1920s study of air forces, the Luftwaffe Air War Doctrine of 1935, directives for officers, World War II tactical instructions, and more.

This study provides an appraisal of Germany's air forces from the post-World War I era through the early stages of World War II. The author demolishes several myths surrounding the Luftwaffe, including the belief that they had no ideas beyond the support of ground forces.

Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created the Reichswehr, a new military organisation built on the wreckage of the old Imperial Army. This book traces the crucial transformations in military tactical doctrine, organisation and training that laid the foundations for the Nazi Blitzkrieg.

This book explores the historical perspective on air bombardment and its association with civilian casualties, arguing that reports of such casualties are often exaggerated. It delves into the implications of these perceptions on the actions of political and media elites, suggesting that the narrative surrounding bombing affects decision-making and public opinion. By critically analyzing the data and reporting on civilian impacts, the author challenges prevailing assumptions about the consequences of aerial warfare.

This volume places the history of the Second World War and the Baltic states into a multidisciplinary and international perspective. It includes contributions from the fields of diplomacy, strategy, military operations, intelligence and propaganda. It presents not only a multi-layered interpretation of a region affected by total war, but also reveals a great deal about the nature of that conflict. It discusses the attitudes of the great powers towards small states, the nature of military operations around the advent of mechanization and close air support, and techniques of population control and of steering opinion in the era of ideological regimes. Contributions on these topics add to our understanding of the Second World War as a pivotal event in the history of Europe in the 20th century.

This book is intended to serve as an advanced course text for students studying the Cold War. The rearmament of both Germanies in the late 1940s-early 1950s was one of the defining moments of the Cold War. The question of rearming Germany became one of the most difficult questions faced by the Western Allies after World War II. Inside West Germany there was also a considerable debate as to whether Germany ought to rearm at all. Once the decision to rearm was made, the Germans and Western Allies ran into all the practical problems of deciding whether Germany would join NATO, what role the Germans would play in the Alliance, how Germany would be armed and the form the armed forces would play in German society. A team of expert authors have examined all of these core questions in detail. An analysis of the origins of reamament in East Germany is also provided. With this book a reader will gain a thorough understanding of the complex issues that faced the West from 1945-1957. Contributors are Jonathan House, Douglas Peifer, Martin Rink, Daniel Jordan, Adam Seipp, Thomas Vogel, Klaus Naumann, Dieter Kollmer and Oliver Haller.