Since the UN Charter was signed in 1945, the evolution of state boundary delimitation has significantly progressed, yet many maritime boundary disputes remain unresolved. These conflicts are often driven by states' desires to secure access to natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, believed to lie within overlapping claims. The International Law Commission and various scholars have explored different cooperation regimes, sometimes overlooking the unique contextual realities of each situation. This work addresses analytical challenges previously identified, employing a novel methodological approach. It first describes and explains variations in the design of bilateral cooperation regimes between states sharing offshore oil and gas deposits. It then examines whether these design variations affect the outcomes, dynamics, and evolution of cooperation. To achieve this, a two-step analytical matrix is applied to several case studies, leading to individual and general conclusions. The methodology is likened to complex adaptive systems, where diverse cases are analyzed under common parameters, allowing for the emergence of plausible conclusions regarding the evolution and impact of institutions across different contexts.
