Revisiting the general electric-honeywell case applying the European commission's more economic approach

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The GE/Honeywell case stands as a pivotal moment in European merger control, marked by a contentious transatlantic debate over the European Commission's 2001 prohibition decision. This study uniquely examines the horizontal overlaps in the aircraft and marine engine markets, which were the sole grounds for the Court of First Instance's endorsement of the decision. Utilizing the 2004 EC Merger Regulation and its guidelines, the analysis extends beyond mere market definition and structural indicators like market shares. It evaluates the competitive closeness of the parties' aircraft engines and the aircraft they power through an analysis of bidding data and technical specifications. The affected engine markets are characterized by fluctuating market shares, significant after-sales revenue, and lucrative alternatives. The research draws from publicly available data, insights from aerospace professionals, and the author's industry expertise. It scrutinizes data available by 2001 that the Commission either overlooked or misinterpreted, challenging the Commission's rationale. Ultimately, this effects-based analysis of GE/Honeywell contradicts the Commission's stance on both horizontal and non-horizontal issues. In such intricate cases, a "more economic approach" to merger control, supported by empirical analysis and industry knowledge, is crucial to prevent the unwarranted prohibition of pro-competitive mergers based on unfounded ha