Concept and analysis

Meer over het boek

The book explores how concepts are studied in philosophy, their methodological role, and the viability of various analytical methods, including conceptual analysis. It engages with contemporary discussions in 'metaphilosophy' and presents bold theses supporting a representationalist theory of meaning and concepts, diverging from traditional ordinary language philosophy. While acknowledging critiques from both philosophy and cognitive sciences, it defends the relevance of conceptual analysis in philosophical inquiry. The text reflects on Frege's influential theory of concepts, which played a significant role in the development of analytic philosophy. It examines Frege's theory of sentential unity and the ongoing challenges stemming from his understanding of concepts, particularly issues highlighted by Russell's Paradox. This leads to a discussion on the nature of logic and the implications for psychological and ontological realism in logic and mathematics. The central section reevaluates ordinary language philosophy and its interpretation of conceptual analysis, asserting that while it cannot encompass all of analytic philosophy, a nuanced understanding of conceptual analysis is essential. The discussion begins broadly with ordinary language philosophy, then transitions into a methodological overview, engaging with epistemological topics through the lens of ordinary language philosophy.