The bounds of freedom: Kant’s causal theory of action

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This monograph offers a fresh interpretation of Kant’s àtemporal view on the causality of free will. It analyzes Kant’s primary conception of action as a causal consequence of the will, drawing on H. P. Grice’s causal theory of perception and P. F. Strawson’s modifications. The work challenges the prevalent notion that Kant’s maxim of action serves as a causal determination. Instead, it posits that the maxim defines the action, concluding that an action, for Kant, is primarily an effect of the will, with the maxim serving as its logical determination. The study also addresses Kant’s àtemporal causality in the context of contemporary philosophical views and his own theory presented in the Second Analogy of Experience, where causality is depicted as a natural, temporal relationship among physical and psychological entities. This creates a tension between the two conceptions. Scholars like Allen W. Wood often reject Kant’s àtemporal causality, while others like Henry E. Allison accept it in a diluted form. However, both camps adhere to the assumption that Kant’s maxim is a causal determination of action. This monograph stands apart by rejecting that assumption and offering an alternative perspective.