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Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War

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Competitive authoritarian regimes – in which autocrats submit to meaningful multiparty elections but engage in serious democratic abuse – proliferated in the post–Cold War era. Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.

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Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way

Taal
Jaar van publicatie
2010
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Titel
Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War
Taal
Engels
Jaar van publicatie
2010
Formaat
Paperback
Aantal pagina's
536
ISBN10
0521709156
ISBN13
9780521709156
Beoordeling
4,25 van 5
Aantekening
Competitive authoritarian regimes – in which autocrats submit to meaningful multiparty elections but engage in serious democratic abuse – proliferated in the post–Cold War era. Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.