Democracy's Chief Executive

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In the view of contemporary presidentialists, the "executive power" granted by the U.S. Constitution is interpreted as it was in 1787, signifying a largely unilateral presidency that they believe serves national interests. This perspective is challenged in a critical examination of its implications, revealing how such interpretations have fostered a presidency vulnerable to authoritarianism. The text explores how rigid beliefs in expansive executive authority cultivate a sense of entitlement within the government, posing a threat to American democracy and the rule of law. It traces the rise of aggressive presidentialism to a consolidation of power in the White House, supported by right-wing legal and judicial influences since 1981. The author argues that this authoritarian interpretation lacks strong originalist backing. Instead, he proposes a model of adaptive constitutionalism that emphasizes the importance of deliberative democracy in balancing presidential powers. The work illustrates that grounding decisions in core democratic values can actually impose greater constraints on judicial outcomes, advocating for a framework that resonates with Americans across the political spectrum.